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This paper investigates the impact of CEO cross-industry and specific-industry experience 
on firm performance, risk-taking behavior, and CEO compensation. Using hand-collected data for 
a large cross-section of CEOs over 1992-2017, we find that CEOs with cross-industry experience 
are not likely to help improve firm performance, tend to invest less on R&D, and are likely to 
receive pay premium. On the other hand, we document a nonmonotonic relation between CEOs’ 
specific-industry experience and firm performance as well as R&D. Particularly, CEOs’ specific-
industry experience leads to higher firm performance and R&D investments until it reaches a 
certain threshold, especially among high growth firms. This paper contributes to the literature that 
examines the impact of CEO characteristics on firm performance and other firm outcomes by 
documenting the effect of cross-industry and specific-industry experience on these outcome 
variables. 




Given the importance of CEO role in the boardroom, operations, corporate control and 
decision-making, a large body of academic research has been devoted to the relationship between 
CEO characteristics and firm outcomes. CEO characteristics have drawn attention of researchers 
in strategic management (e.g. Karaevli, 2007), human resource management (e.g. Bragaw & 
Misangyi, 2017), finance (e.g. Custodio & Metzger, 2013) and other fields of study. Upper echelon 
perspective states that differences in observable and psychological characteristics of top executives 
result in different organizational strategic choices (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). However, the 
existing literature is inadequate when it comes to exploring the potential impact of the depth and 
breadth of CEO industry experience on important business aspects. CEO industry experience 
provides network connections, knowledge and complementary insights that help them anticipate 
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industry conditions and trends and interpret business situations more effectively. CEO industry 
experience also matters because economic forces affect firms in the same or related industries in a 
similar way. Hence, the stronger the link between a firm’s industry and its related industries, the 
greater the value of knowledge and insights gathered from prior experience in related industry. 
Strong economic link can be understood from high correlation between the stock returns of the 
firm’s industry and its related industries (Dass et al., 2013). To provide a deeper understanding of 
how CEO industry experience influences different business aspects, this study will address the 
following related questions: How does CEO industry experience influence firm performance, risk-
taking behavior and CEO compensation? Do these relationships vary depending on growth profile 
of firms? Literature in corporate finance mostly focused on analyzing the prior industry experience 
of directors of board (e.g. Faleye et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2017; Dass et al., 
2013 etc.). Our study contributes to existing literature to fill this gap by exclusively focusing on 
CEO industry experience instead of directors’ industry experience. 
The objective of this study is to examine how CEO industry experience influences firm 
performance, risk-taking decisions and CEO compensation. A newly hired CEO is considered to 
have specific-industry experience if he/she has experience in top executive positions, e.g. CEO, 
CFO, COO etc. in different firms of the same industry. Custódio et al. (2013) have classified these 
CEOs as a specialist CEO who spent their whole professional career in a single industry, i.e. these 
CEOs have depth of industry experience. On the other hand, a newly hired CEO is said to have 
general managerial experience (skills not specific to any industry or firm and transferable across 
industries) if he/she has experience in top executive positions in industries other than the one 
he/she is currently employed. These CEOs have breadth of industry experience. Custódio et al. 
(2013) have classified these CEOs as a generalist CEO. Murphy & Zábojnik (2004) have argued 
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that there has been an increase in the relative importance of general managerial skills and a 
decrease in the importance of firm-specific managerial skills and knowledge in the CEO job. 
Frydman (2019) confirms this shift to the importance of general managerial skills for top 
executives. We have focused on the CEO mobility across industries to understand this trend in 
labor market. Using a unique hand-collected dataset on 1,127 CEOs of S&P 500 companies for 
the period 1992-2017, this paper provides evidence that cross-industry and specific-industry 
experience of CEO have significant influence on firm performance, risk-taking and CEO 
compensation. We control for many firm-specific variables and CEO characteristics in our 
analysis. The empirical findings indicate to the negative impact of CEO cross-industry experience 
on firm performance and risk-taking but positive influence on CEO compensation. On the other 
hand, the result shows an inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO specific-industry 
experience and both firm performance and risk-taking. 
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides an overview of literature on the 
relationship between CEO characteristics, particularly CEO industry experience and business-
related parameters as well as testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, variables and 
research methods. The empirical analysis and findings are presented in section 4. Finally, section 
5 makes concluding remarks and discusses the implications of the result as well as contribution of 
the paper. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Brockman et al. (2016) find that insiders have a 58% probability of possessing specialist 
skills while outsiders have a 57% probability of possessing generalist skills. Boards can recruit an 
outsider CEO with the hope that he/she can serve as the catalyst for change. Sometimes firms look 
outside for new CEOs either because of a lack of qualified internal candidates (Howard, 2001) or 
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a need for the new perspectives, skills, or knowledge that can be gained from outsiders. Huson et 
al. (2004) notes that outside successor CEOs positively affect performance change. However, 
outsider CEOs can be from either the same, i.e. related industry or a different industry. The increase 
in hiring cross-industry CEOs in sectors such as consumer goods and services, life sciences, 
technology, and media over the last decades has received significant attention from researchers. 
This phenomenon may point to the increasing necessity of unique benefits associated with cross-
industry general managerial skills of CEO. Investigating whether firm performance, risk-taking 
behavior and CEO compensation vary with regard to different type of CEO industry experience 
has implications for board of directors overseeing succession planning. 
2.1 CEO Industry Experience and Firm Performance 
There are numerous studies that have examined firm performance from different 
standpoints. One stream of existing literature has investigated the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO characteristics such as age, gender, tenure, educational and professional 
qualification etc.  Our paper contributes to the vast literature on CEO characteristics by examining 
the potential impact of CEO industry experience on firm performance. 
Job-related knowledge, skills, and abilities are expected to enhance job performance. 
Motivations for hiring within-industry CEO come from the fact that such hiring is not only an 
opportunity for firms to learn from other firms in the same industry but also may speed up decision 
making. Compared to the generic skills of an outside-industry successor, the industry-specific 
skills of intra-industry successors may be readily transferable to firms in the same industry 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991). Custódio et al. (2013) find that, compared to firms with generalist 
CEOs, firms with specialist CEOs have slightly higher accounting performance and stock market 
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performance. So, a positive relationship between specific-industry experience and firm 
performance is expected.  
However, the opposing view is that hiring CEOs with prior industry success does not 
necessarily mean that the same formula will work in the new firm in the same industry. Successful 
adaptation and transition are very important to understanding the new company’s employees, 
products, structure, culture, and politics. One notable view is that experience from past events may 
act as “knowledge corridors,” making it difficult for them both to adjust their decision-making and 
act differently in new contexts (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015). Simply to say, “Old habits die hard” 
is a reason behind low performance of CEOs with prior experience in this post in the same industry. 
One explanation for this finding may be the fact that the job-specific experience CEOs gain in their 
prior CEO job is likely to interfere with their performance in their new job. Hence, prior experience 
slows down learning in a new context because some knowledge and skills need to be “unlearned” 
before learning in the new context can take place (Morrison & Brantner, 1992). These arguments 
lead to our first research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between specific-industry experience 
and firm performance. 
There has been an increasingly common practice of appointing more generalist CEOs with 
the aim of improving firm performance. Although CEOs with more general managerial experience 
are expected to earn a significant pay premium, whether their prior industry experience is 
associated with higher firm performance remains inadequately researched. Empirical findings 
regarding performance implications of CEO experience variety are mixed. Howard (2001) opines 
that outside-industry CEOs can bring new insight, technology, strategies and market outside the 
current firm’s industry boundary. Jalal & Prezas (2012) examine outside CEO succession for 528 
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firms during the period 1993–2009.  In line with the findings of previous literature, they find that 
on average, firms hiring CEOs from within the same industry had higher overall returns than those 
with non-industry outsiders, at least during the first few months. By the third- or fourth-year 
following succession, firms hiring CEO from different industry showed better stock returns, on 
average, than those hiring from the same industry. The companies that hired CEOs from a different 
industry also paid more dividends to shareholders, engaged in higher capital spending, and 
demonstrated better operating performance.  
In contrary, Li & Patel (2018) find a negative relationship between more generalist CEO 
experience, i.e. experience across different industries and firm performance. However, this 
negative association is lessened with longer CEO tenure. Mueller et al. (2017) state that the 
relationship between CEO experience variety and firm performance is like inverted U-shaped 
which means that gaining experience from different firms and industries leads to higher firm 
performance but, after a threshold, CEOs with extensive levels of CEO experience variety might 
lack experience depth and specialization, a shortcoming resulting in declining firm performance. 
Results also show that firm’s level of internal and external complexity affects this relationship. 
Outside-industry CEOs are unfamiliar with the industry, but they are selected because they 
have demonstrated superior leadership and managerial skills. CEOs without prior industry 
experience can bring fresh eyes to the company and are more likely to work as change agents. 
However, a team of technical experts with industry know-how can fill in the gaps by providing 
industry information. The degree of change required by the new organization influences the entire 
process. Outside-industry CEOs are not deeply rooted in the industry and may lack a good 
understanding of its major opportunities and threats, product lines, manufacturing process etc. As 
a result, compared to intra-industry CEOs, CEOs with multiple industry experience are less likely 
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to initiate and implement strategic changes that can boost up long-term firm performance. These 
reasonings lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: CEO cross-industry experience is likely to result in lower firm performance. 
2.2 CEO Industry Experience and Firm Risk-Taking Behavior 
Risk-taking can be described as the extent to which top managers are motivated to take 
business-related risks in an uncertain environment (Covin and Slevin, 1988). Risk taking has 
statistically and economically significant effects on firm’s value, corporate growth and corporate 
earnings (Xu, 2015). R&D expenditure decisions affect the implied risk profile of a firm. Several 
empirical studies have investigated the effects of firm industry, diversification strategy, ownership 
structure, and board characteristics on R&D spending (e.g. Sujit and Mukherjee, 2005).  
There are a handful of empirical studies that have examined the R&D spending decision 
from the perspective of agency and corporate governance theories (Mezghanni, 2010). However, 
these studies did not consider the influence of top executives’ attributes in strategic decision 
making. A firm’s investment decisions can be highly influenced by top managers’ preferences and 
attitudes. CEO characteristics significantly influence firm R&D practices. Top executives exercise 
managerial discretion over the level of R&D spending. Barker & Mueller (2002) find that CEO 
age positively affects the level of R&D while career experience, advanced science-related degrees 
and tenure negatively affects R&D spending. Hence, understanding the nature of relationship 
between CEO characteristics and firm’s risk taking will contribute to making better strategic 
decision making with regard to R&D spending. This study contributes to the existing literature by 
shedding light on this less-explored issue by examining the relationship between CEO industry 
experience and R&D spending that points to risk-taking behavior of firms. 
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Whereas a riskier investment policy indicates to higher R&D and lower capital 
expenditures, less risky policy choices refer to lower R&D and higher capital expenditures (Coles, 
2006). R&D and capital expenditure are subject to considerable managerial discretion. On that 
ground, relationship between CEO characteristics and corporate risk-taking behavior has been 
tested in prior literature. Our study has considered R&D investment as a proxy for risk-taking 
behavior. 
Impact of CEO attributes on risk taking has been well-explored from different perspectives. 
Our study complements findings of previous literature on firms’ risk-taking behavior. Malmendier 
& Tate (2005) examined the impact of overconfidence and other personal characteristics of CEO 
on investment decisions. The study finds that though investment of overconfident CEOs is 
significantly more responsive to cash flow, this relationship is strongly affected by other personal 
characteristics such as education, employment background etc. of CEO. On the contrary, Boyson 
(2003) examines how the risk-taking behavior of hedge fund managers and finds that managerial 
career concern persuades more experienced managers to take on less risk. This finding implies that 
risk taking behavior of managers change as they age and gain more experience.  In a similar study, 
Menkhoff et al. (2006) finds that if overconfidence is interpreted as overestimated precision of 
knowledge, degree of overconfidence decreases with experience of fund managers. Hence, fund 
managers’ risk-taking decreases as they gain more experience.  During the earlier period of their 
career, CEOs are more willing to take risky projects in an attempt to catch market attention and 
signal about own capability (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). As managers’ age, they become more 
risk-averse and tend to adopt less risky decisions in order to safe their career (Eaton and Rosen, 
1983). Particularly, as CEOs approach retirement age, they become more risk-averse and reduce 
R&D spending (Dechow and Sloan, 1991). One explanation is that risky R&D projects may not 
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yield personal benefits in the form of short-term salary and bonuses for CEOs approaching 
retirement age. The existence of non-monotonic inverted U-shaped relationship between 
experience and risk-taking is supported by several studies (e.g. Ryan & Wiggins, 2002; 
Mezghanni, 2010)  
Studies have explored how CEO career origin influences firm’s risk taking. Chahyadi & 
Wineka (2012) find that outsider CEOs make more risky investment decisions in the form of more 
investment in R&D, less in capital expenditure and use of more leverage. Faccio et al. (2016) 
investigate the relation between CEO gender, corporate risk-taking choices, and the efficiency of 
capital allocation. They find that female CEOs make less risky corporate choices than male CEOs. 
Besides gender, age of CEO also matters in risk-taking decisions. Younger CEOs (Kovalchik et 
al., 2005) and wealthier CEOs (Calvet and Sodini, 2014) demonstrate more risk-taking behavior. 
  The benefits realization from current investment in capital expenditures and R&D take 
many years following the investment. However, unlike R&D, capital expenditures are not 
immediately expensed. So, capital expenditure decreases accounting earnings by only the first-
year depreciation amount. Therefore, departing CEOs may have incentive to reduce R&D 
expenditures more than capital expenditures in order to boost earnings-based compensation.  
Industry expertise provides a better comprehension of the risk and reward situations of the 
industry. Avery and Chevalier (1999) finds that more experienced mutual fund managers have 
lower reputational concerns that ultimately result in more risk-taking compared to less experienced 
fellow managers. Faleye et al. (2018) state that firms with industry expert directors invest more on 
R&D and receive more patents for the same level of R&D. Yung and Chen (2017) demonstrate 
that high ability managers are more receptive to risk-taking and tend to spend more on R&Ds and 
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less on capital expenditures. Gaining experience over time gives them more knowledge and 
confidence in their ability. These arguments lead to our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: CEO specific-industry experience is more likely to result in higher R&D spending.  
Zhang & Rajagopalan (2003) state that more and more firms in recent years have recruited 
CEOs from outside their firm from within the hiring firms' industries and from outside their 
industries. Firms may hire CEOs from outside industry with the expectation that these CEOs will 
bring new eyes to the previously unseen opportunities and import new perspective to the current 
firm. Custódio et al. (2017) opine that generalist CEOs acquire knowledge beyond the firm’s 
current technological domain and hence, can spur innovation. They also find that firms with CEOs 
with general managerial skills produce more patents. Outside industry CEOs are mostly hired 
during bad times of the firms. But Castanias & Helfat (2001) opine that new CEOs recruited from 
other firms in the same industry possess greater tacit industry-specific knowledge of opportunities, 
threats, competitive forces, technological changes etc. than those from different industries.  
But experience from variety of industries may not be transferable to the new setting 
because of the idiosyncratic differences among industries.  Prior research suggests that moving 
across different sectors constrain the extent to which executives can apply managerial skills across 
different sectors (Bailey & Helfat, 2003). Though CEOs who worked in different industries are 
expected to have developed general managerial skills, because of lack of depth in experience in 
the new industry, CEOs engaged in job hopping across industries may feel less confident in making 
large amount of investment in R&D. They may not have complete picture of the industry. Hence, 
they may lack enough knowledge in anticipating trends and movements in the industry. 
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R&D activities are long-term investment and payoffs are not only very uncertain but also 
often take many years. Industry expert CEOs who spend long periods in an industry are more likely 
to benefit from these long-term project payoffs (Zajac & Stearns, 1997). Recognizing risks and 
rewards of potential investments gets easier for CEOs with industry knowledge (Drobetz et al., 
2018). It can be argued that if CEOs lack an in-depth understanding of the industry-fundamentals, 
such as the effect of microeconomic and macroeconomic factors, they will also lack the knowledge 
necessary for effective longer-term strategies such as R&D spending. These arguments lead to our 
next hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: CEO cross-industry experience is more likely to result in lower R&D expenditure.  
2.3 CEO Industry Experience and Compensation 
Like other CEO characteristics, industry experience has significant implications for CEO 
compensation. Although there has been extensive research examining the impact of different CEO 
characteristics on CEO compensation, literature explaining CEO compensation by looking at the 
type of experience, i.e. specific vs. general has not been the subject of large-scale empirical 
analyses. This paper adds to existing literature by investigating how specific-industry and general 
managerial experience across industries influence CEO compensation.  
Prior literature has tested CEO compensation in light of CEO characteristics such as age, 
gender, tenure, origin etc. along with other firm-level determinants. Ryan & Wiggins (2002) 
consider investment opportunity, firm size, CEO tenure and age, monitoring mechanisms, cash 
flow uncertainty, capital structure etc. as factors influencing CEO compensation. Fee and Hadlock 
(2003) note that CEOs in firms with above average performance are more likely to receive higher 
pay when hired by the new firms. Frydman & Jenter (2010) state that CEO compensation is 
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affected by both managerial power and competitive market forces. Falato et al. (2011) find that 
CEO talent is a vital factor influencing compensation. Using a sample of 654 US CEO succession 
events that took place between 2001 and 2004, Bragaw & Misangyi (2017) explored the impact of 
CEO experience on firm’s performance and CEO compensation. Interestingly, the study finds that 
prior CEO experience does not benefit shareholders in the form of higher market-based 
performance though it tends to benefit CEO in the form of higher compensation.  
Since industry-specific skills may not be transferable, CEOs who spent their career in a 
single industry are more likely to have little bargaining power in the outside labor market. As a 
result, firms are less likely to rise pay for these CEOs. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5: CEO specific-industry experience leads to lower CEO compensation. 
Breadth of CEO industry experience, i.e. experience in executive roles across industries 
might help them advance ahead of their peers. Hiring organizations normally provide higher 
compensation to outsider CEOs than to insiders (Murphy & Zábojnik, 2004). The literature suggest 
that this increase in compensation can be somewhat attributed to the recent increase in the demand 
for generalist skills. Murphy & Zabojnik (2004) documents that CEOs hired from outside earn 
approximately 15.3 percent more than CEOs who were promoted internally.  Jalal & Prezas (2012) 
opines that the compensation package offered to CEOs hired from outside the industry tends to 
be higher and more tightly linked to the long-term performance of the firm. Custódio et al. 
(2013) shed light on why generalist CEOs earn pay premium and opine that firms hire generalist 
CEOs and pay significant pay premium to these CEOs when these firms or the industry the firms 
belong to go through merger and acquisition, financial distress, restructuring or other changing 
business situations. Another explanation is that generalist CEOs are more high profile, move from 
job to job and draw more attention from boards (Malmendier & Tate, 2009). Brockman et al. 
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(2016) finds that outsider CEOs with high generalist skills are the highest paid executives. While 
generalist premium can be attributed to the need for generalist skills, outsider premium can be 
attributed to the enhanced bargaining power of those CEOs. 
Hypothesis 6: CEO cross-industry general managerial experience leads to higher CEO 
compensation. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Sample and Data 
The sample consists of CEO data collected from the Standard & Poor’s Execucomp 
database between 1992 and 2017. An executive is classified as CEO if the Execucomp’s “titleann” 
contains phrases such as “CEO” or “Chief Executive Officer” or “Principal Executive Officer” for 
that executive in the Execucomp database. from the sample,we have excluded utility companies 
(SIC 4900-4999) because they are subject to certain regulation and financial services firms (SIC 
6000-6999) because they have distinct financial structure. We collect accounting data from 
Compustat database over the same time period (1992-2017) and stock return data from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The final sample consists of 4,816 CEO firm-
year observations. 
3.2 Variables  
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
We test the impact of CEO industry experience on three dependent variables: firm 
performance, risk-taking behavior and CEO compensation. To focus on operational performance 
instead of market-based performance, we use Return on Asset (ROA) as a measure of performance. 
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We measure risk-taking behavior by the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets and R&D 
expenditure to sales. CEO total compensation is the proxy for compensation. 
3.2.2 Test Variables 
Cross Industry Experience: The variable “Multi-Ind” refers to the presence or absence 
of general managerial experience. CEOs are classified as CEOs with general managerial 
experience if they have experience in any of the following roles: CEO, CFO, President, Executive 
Vice President, Senior Vice President, Corporate Vice President, Managing Director, General 
Manager, Executive Director, Chairman, Vice Chairman with administration duties, or any C-Suite 
executive in and other than S&P 500 companies. We measure “Multi_ind” variable as the number 
of different industry the CEO has served in the above mentioned positions.  
Specific-Industry Experience: The variable “Specific_ind” refers to the presence or 
absence of specific-industry experience. We measure “Specific_ind” as the length of experience 
in the same industry (same in first three digits of SIC code). To capture the non-linear effect of 
CEO specific industry experience, we include the squred specific_ind variable in the research 
model.  
3.2.3 Firm Control variables 
Our research model includes several firm-specific control variables that may influence 
performance and other variables of interest. These control variables include firm size, leverage, 
growth opportunity, research and development (R&D), dividends, capital expenditure, return 
volatility etc.  Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is measured 
as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Market to book ratio (MTB) is computed as the ratio 
of market value of equity to book value of equity. R&D is computed as the ratio of R&D 
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expenditure to sales. Dividends is measured as the sum of dividends from preferred and common 
stock scaled by total assets. Capex represents the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets, 
indicating to the degree to which the firm invests in fixed assets. To measure risk, we have taken 
stock return volatility (daily return data) as a measure of risk. Volatility is defined as the sum of 
the squared residual from the Fama-French’s (1993) three-factor model. Net working capital is 
used to measure the cash and operating liquidity position of the firm. 
3.2.4 CEO Control Variables 
To control for CEO characteristics, we collect their biographical information such as 
gender, tenure, and educational background. Educational background is used to proxy general 
ability, a predictor of firm performance, risk taking and CEO compensation. To measure the 
educational profile, we create two dummy variables. One dummy variable is MBA which takes a 
value of 1 if the CEO has an MBA, and 0 otherwise. Another dummy variable is Masters_PhD 
which takes a value of 1 if the CEO has either master’s or PhD, and 0 otherwise. CEO Tenure 
indicates the length of time CEOs served in the current position. To control for gender, we take 
Female dummy variable which is equal to1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise. The biographical 
information is collected from multiple sources such as Execucomp, Bloomberg.com, NNDB.com, 
Referenceforbusiness.com, Prabook.com, MarketScreener.com and other publicly available 
sources. Table 5 provides definition or measurement of the variables used in this paper. 
3.3 Research Methods 
Using OLS, this paper examines the impact of CEO industry experience on dependent 
variables. Moreover, to control for any unobserved effects, we include industry fixed effect and 
year fixed effect using industry dummies and year dummies. To examine the impact of CEO’s 
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industry experience on firm outcomes in different business environments, we also categorize the 
sample into high-growth and low-growth firms based on the sample-median market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) in each year. P values are calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard 
errors. To limit the influence of outliers and misrecorded data, variables are winsorized at the 1% 
at both tails. To check the robustness of our empirical result, we include CEO’s age in the model 
and all the results are maintained. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for key variables in the study. Out of 1,127 
CEOs in the sample, 35% (393 CEOs) have MBA degree and 19% (219 CEOs) have either 
master’s or PhD degree. 25% (287 CEOs) have experience in more than one industry while the 
average length of specific-industry experience is 18.02 years. Female CEOs constitute only 12% 
(130) of our sample. The average CEO has tenure in executive position for 6.3 years. The longest 
serving CEO has been in executive position for 49 years. Average market to book ratio is 2.42. 
Average ROA is 11.86%. Dividend, fixed asset, capital expenditure and debt are 1.99%, 28.50%, 
5.56% and 22.92% of total asset respectively, on average. The average R&D to total sales ratio is 
6.24. 
***Insert Table 1 here*** 
4.2 Result on CEO Industry Experience and Firm Performance 
In this section, we test hypothesis 1 and 2 regarding the association between CEO industry 
experiences and firm performance. We employ model 1 to capture the impact of specific-industry 
experience on firm performance. The model control for selected CEO characteristics and firm-
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level accounting variables. We also include the squared specific-industry variable to look at 
whether there exists any non-linear relationship: 
Firm_Perfi,t = B0 + B1 Specific_indi,t + B2 Specific_ind_sqi,t + B3-6 (CEO controls)i,t + B7 MTBi,t + 
B8 Volatilityi,t + B9 Capexi,t + B10 R&Di,t + B11 Firm size i,t + B12 Leveragei,t +B13 Dividendsi,t + B14 
NWCi,t + B15 Fixed Assetsi,t + ei,t          (1) 
Model 2 analyzes the impact of multiple-industry experience on firm performance controlling for 
other CEO characteristics and firm-level accounting variables: 
Firm_Perfi,t = B0 + B1 Multi-indi,t + B2-5 (CEO controls)i,t + B6 MTBi,t + B7 Volatilityi,t + B8 Capexi,t 
+ B9 R&Di,t + B10 Firm size i,t + B11 Leveragei,t +B12 Dividendsi,t + B13 NWCi,t + B14 Fixed Assetsi,t 
+ ei,t                                         (2) 
***Insert Table 2 here*** 
Column 2 of table 2 reports the OLS results explaining the impact of CEO specific-industry 
experience on firm performance considering full sample data set. The length of specific-industry 
experience is found to positively affect firm performance. This may be because industry 
knowledge is an important quality that can help CEOs understand factors that can have economic 
impact on operations, earnings, expenses and other business parameters. In addition, previous 
industry connections can provide valuable information that improves firm performance. However, 
this finding is contrary to the result of Hamori & Koyuncu (2015) who, focusing on the CEOs of 
the S&P 500 corporations as of 2005, find that CEOs with prior CEO experience in the same 
industry are associated with significantly lower post-succession firm performance than those with 
experience in a different industry. Next, we test the models for high-growth and low-growth firms 
and present the result in column 3 and 4 of table 2. We find that the same is true for both high-
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growh and low-growth firms. This finding supports the view that experience in the same industry 
helps CEOs contribute to better performance of firms. This effect is statistically very signifcant in 
all three cases (full sample, high-growth and low-growth firms). Interestingly, the magnitude is 
the same for full sample and high-growth sample though a bit smaller for low-growth firms. This 
difference in coefficient between high-growth and low-growth firms might be driven by the fact 
that high-growth firms get higher sales turnover and revenue from new products in the market, 
leading to better firm performance measued by ROA. 
Though gaining experience in the same industry has several positive expected effects, 
remaining in the same industry might have some negative effects as well. As indicated by the 
negative coefficient of the squared specific industry variable, after a threshold level of 18.83 years, 
experience in the same industry leads to adversely affect firm performance. One explanation is 
that as CEOs gain more experience in the same industry, it sometimes becomes difficult to think 
out of the box and deviate from industry norm in order to improve firm performance. Over time, 
they may have developed fixed assumptions about how decisions should be made or works should 
be done. They are more likely to repeat the similar course of actions in different situations, a 
phenomenon called negative transfer of learning (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015) that refers to 
misapplication of previously acquired knowledge and skill in changed context. Jobs in the same 
industry share surface similarities but can often have structural differences (Dokko et al., 2009). 
This limits the beneficial effects of specific-industry experience and knowledge. In another word, 
related work experience for a long time could have a negative effect on firm performance since 
prior industry experience of CEOs may also bring inflexibilities that act as baggage and push down 




Table 2 also describes the OLS results explaining the impact of CEO multiple-industry 
experience on firm performance considering full sample, high-growth and low-growth sample in 
column 5, 6 and 7 respectively. For the full sample, the negative coefficient of Multi-ind variable 
indicates that hiring CEOs with cross-industry experience is not likely to help improve firm 
performance, rather adversely affects firm performance. This evidence supports the hypothesis 2 
which predicts that CEOs with cross-industry experience will negatively influence firm 
performance. Then, when we run regressions seperately for the two sub-samples, we find that 
cross-industry experience of CEOs affects firm performance negatively for both high-growth and 
low-growth firms and the effects are statistically significant. Hence, the hypothesis predicting the 
negative association between CEO cross-industry experience and firm performance is supported 
empirically. This effect is mostly driven by the fact that CEO with multiple industry experience 
might lack critical industry-specific knowledge in which he/she is currently employed as CEO. It 
is also challenging for hiring firms to establish good fit between the human capital of CEOs with 
multiple industry experience and the culture of the hiring firms.  
4.3 Result on CEO Industry Experience and Risk-taking Behavior 
Gan (2019) opines that top managers’ differing views affect their decisions, beliefs, and 
risk preferences. We take R&D expenditure as a proxy for risk-taking behavior and use as the 
dependent variable. Model 3 reports the OLS regression model used to assess the association 
between CEO specific-industry experience and R&D. 
R&Di,t = B0 + B1 Specific-indi,t + B2 Specific-indi,t + B3-6 (CEO controls)i,t + B7 MTBi,t + B8 
Volatilityi,t + B9 Firm_ Perfi,t + B10 Capexi,t + B11 Firm size i,t + B12 Leveragei,t +B13 Dividendsi,t + 
B14 NWCi,t + B15 Fixed Assetsi,t + ei,t         (3) 
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Controlling for the selected CEO characteristics and accounting variables, model 4 looks at how 
multiple-industry experience may affect R&D: 
R&Di,t = B0 + B1 Multi-indi,t + B2-5 (CEO controls)i,t + B6 MTBi,t + B7 Volatilityi,t + B8 Firm_ Perfi,t 
+ B9 Capexi,t + B10 Firm size i,t + B11 Leveragei,t +B12 Dividendsi,t + B13 NWCi,t + B14 Fixed Assetsi,t 
+ ei,t             (4) 
***Insert Table 3 here*** 
Table 3 presents the results on the association between R&D and CEO industry experience. 
Column 2, 3 and 4 show the impact of specific-industry experience on R&D controlling for other 
CEO characteristics and firm-level variables. Length of CEO experience in the same industry is 
found to positively affect R&D expenditure of firms considering full sample, high-growth and 
low-growth firms. This finding supports our hypothesis 3 predicting possitive association between 
CEO spcific-industry experience and R&D expenditure. One possible explanation is that CEOs 
serving for long in an industry know better about that industry, a knowledge that makes them 
confident to invest more in R&D. However, as indicated by the negative coefficient of  the squared 
specific_ind variable, after a vertex point of 24.13 years of experience in the same industry, more 
experienced CEOs start investing less in R&D activities. This finding gives the impression that 
CEOs with more specific-industry experience become conservative during the later years of 
executive career and are likely to under-invest in risky R&D activities though they are more willing 
to take risky projects such as R&D activities during their earlier years of executive roles in the 
same industry. This finding is in line with the finding of Ryan & Wiggins (2002) and Mezghanni 
(2010) who argue that experience and risk-taking behavior are not linearly related. Rather, there is 
a non-monotonic inverted U-shaped relationship between these two variables. Magnitude of 
coefficient is higher for high-growth firms compared to that of low-growth firms though the impact 
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on low-growth firms’ R&D is not statistically significant. This might be because CEOs in high-
growth firms recognize the importance of mainting high investment  in R&D to continue growth 
and have the incentive to invest more on R&D to develop investment opportunities. This result 
reinstate the idea that high-growth firms have greater R&D intensity. 
Table 3 also demonstrates the effect of CEO multiple-industry experience on R&D. For 
the full sample, the statistically significant negative coefficient of Multi-ind variable indicates that 
hiring CEOs with multi-industry experience is not likely to increase R&D investment, rather 
reduces this spending. This result might be driven by the inalienability of variety of industry 
knowledge due to distinctive nature of industries the CEOs worked. Since firm structure, industry 
growth, and ownership have significant moderating role in influencing managerial risk taking 
(Hoskisson, 2017), we look at how the scenario changes if we consider next high-growth and low-
growth firms seperately. Running the regressions seperately for both high-growth and low-growth 
firms reinforces the negative and significant association between CEO cross-industry experience 
and R&D expenditure though the negative impact is higher for low-growth firms. Overall, this 
evidence supports hypothesis 4 which predicts that CEOs with cross-industry experience will 
invest less on R&D expenditure.  
4.4 Result on CEO Industry Experience and Compensation 
Special reports every year on CEO compensation by business publications and research 
organizations point to the interesting fact that CEO compensation is a matter of public attention 
and interest (Yanadori & Milkovich, 2002) and has long become a subject of academic research. 
CEO industry tenure reflects CEOs’ skills and knowledge. With this theoritical motivation as 
backdrop, in this section, we test whether industry experience is a significant determinant of CEO 
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compensation. To explore the influence of CEO specific-industry experience on CEO 
compensation, we employ model 5. 
Compensationi,t = B0 + B1 Specific-indi,t + B2 Specific-indi,t + B3-6 (CEO controls)i,t + B7 MTBi,t + 
B8 Volatilityi,t + B9 Firm_Perfi,t + B10 Capexi,t + B11 R&D i,t +B12 Firm size i,t + B13 Leveragei,t +B14 
Dividendsi,t + B15 NWCi,t + B16 Fixed Assetsi,t + ei,t      (5) 
Model 6 reports the impact of multiple-industry experience on compensation: 
Compensationi,t = B0 + B1 Multi-indi,t + B2-5 (CEO controls)i,t + B6 MTBi,t + B7 Volatilityi,t + B8 
Firm_Perfi,t + B9 Capexi,t + B10 R&D i,t +B11 Firm size i,t + B12 Leveragei,t +B13 Dividendsi,t + B14 
NWCi,t + B15 Fixed Assetsi,t + ei,t         (6) 
***Insert Table 4 here*** 
Table 4 describes the results on how CEO specific-industry experience affects CEO 
compensation. Specific_ind variable denoting the length of CEO experience in the same industry 
is found to have statistically significant negative impact on CEO compensation considering full 
sample. This outcome may be because of non-transferability of specific-industry knowledge and 
the resulting limited bargaining power of industry-specialist CEOs who spent their career in a 
singly industry in the outside labor market. Since firm-specific characteristics can play role in 
designing the compensation structure, we next run the model for high-growth and low-growth 
firms. For high-growth firms, we find that CEOs with specific-industry experience receive less 
compensation as they keep working in the same industry. However, having specific-industry 
experience has positive and insignificant influence on CEO compensation for low-growth firms. 
This result proposes that the effect of CEO industry experience on compensation can be different 
based on firm’s operating environment and growth prospect. 
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Table 4 also presents the impact of  CEO multiple-industry experience on CEO 
compensation. First we run the test for the full sample. The statistically significant positive 
coefficient of Multi-ind variable indicates that hiring CEOs having multi-industry experience are 
likely to get higher compensation. This evidence supports the hypothesis 3 which predicts that 
CEOs with cross-industry experience will receive pay premium. This finding is interesting because 
CEOs with multiple-industry experience are paid more though hiring CEOs with cross-industry 
experience leads to negative impact on firm performance. This outcome is consistent with the 
observation of Custódio et al. (2013) who found that generalist CEOs who have accumulated more 
general managerial skills during their career earned 19% more, on average, during the past two 
decades than their specialized counterparts, i.e. CEOs who specialized in one industry or company. 
Existing literature often stated that CEO compensation and firm performance are weakly or 
insignificantly related (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). This weak relationship between firm 
performance and CEO pay has been making researchers upset since researchers expected that CEO 
compensation will be aligned with firm performance to spur the endeavors CEOs take to improve 
firm performance. 
To see whether this relationship gets influenced by the growth level of firms, we run the 
regression analysis seperately for high-growth and low-growth firms. Interestingly, the magnitude 
of coefficient of multiple-industry variable for low-growth industry is very close to that  for  the 
full-samle. Though the coefficient is positive for high-growth firms, it is statistically insignificant. 
The pay premium is higher for CEOs (with multiple industry experience) hired by low-growth 
firms compared to that for high-growth firms. This outcome is not in line with the finding of Gaver 
and Gaver (1995) who posit that CEOs of high growth firms are more likely to receive larger total 
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compensation than CEOs of lower growth companies as a result of higher incentive compensation 
to reduce manager-shareholder agency costs. 
 Therefore, the hypothesis predicting the positive association between CEO cross-industry 
experience and pay premium is partly empirically reinforced.  
5. CONCLUSION 
The selection of CEO has been commonly thought to be an important decision since CEOs 
can influence firms’ future direction and strategy. This paper investigates the effect of CEO 
industry experience on firm performance, risk-taking behavior and CEO compensation using hand-
collected data for a large cross-section of CEOs over 1992-2017. To see whether the effect of CEO 
industry experience differs based on growth opportunities of firms, ee decompose industry 
experience into specific-industry experience and multiple-industry experience. Besides the 
variables of interest, CEO control and firm control variables have been included in the analysis.    
First, considering full sample, high-growh and low-growth firms, we find that the length 
of specific-industry experience positively affects firm performance but the impact becomes 
negative after a certain threshold level. We highlight that firms need to consider this in selection 
decisions. This research finding suggests that it is important to understand that hiring CEOs who 
worked in the same industry for long time period is not beneficial in perpetuity for improving firm 
performance. This result implies that to mitigate the negative transfer of learning after a certain 
number of years of experience in the same industry, CEOs need to adapt to the changed situations.  
Moreover, it is found that for the full sample and two sub-samples, hiring CEOs with cross-
industry experience is not likely to help improve firm performance, rather adversely affects firm 
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performance. Hence, the hypothesis predicting the negative association between CEO cross-
industry experience and firm performance is supported empirically.  
Second, length of CEO experience in the same industry is found to positively affect R&D 
expenditure. One possible explanation is that CEOs serving for long in an industry know better 
about that industry-specific competitive conditions, industry players, resources, strategies and 
technologies, a knowledge that makes them confident to invest more in R&D. Hence, the 
hypothesis predicting the positive association between CEO specific-industry experience and risk-
taking behavior is reinforced empirically. However, the effect becomes negative after certain 
threshold number of years. On the other hand, contrary to Custódio et al. (2017), our study 
documents that hiring CEOs with multi-industry experience is can result in reduced R&D 
expenditure, regardless of the growth opportunity of firms. This evidence supports the hypothesis 
which predicts that CEOs with cross-industry experience will invest less on R&D expenditure.  
Third, a notable finding of our analysis is that length of CEO experience in the same 
industry is found to have statistically significant negative impact on CEO compensation for full 
sample and high-growth firms but positive and insignificant influence for low-growth firms.  Due 
to probable non-transferability of industry-specific skills leading to less bargaining power in the 
outside labor market, CEOs earning industry-specific skills are more likely to receive discounted 
pay. In addition, CEOs having multi-industry experience are likely to get higher compensation. 
This evidence supports the hypothesis which predicts that CEOs with cross-industry experience 
will receive pay premium. However, CEOs (with cross-industry experience) hired by low-growth 
firms are likely to receive pay premium compared to similar kind of CEOs hired by high-growth 
firms. Therefore, the hypothesis predicting the positive association between CEO cross-industry 
experience and pay premium is mostly empirically reinforced.  
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One important implication is that to enhance firm performance and R&D spending, firms 
should hire CEOs with specific-industry experience not beyond the threshold levels of years of 
same-industry experience. We contribute to the literature that examines the impact of C-suite 
executive characteristics on firm outcomes (e.g., Bragaw & Misangyi, 2017). This paper 
contributes to the literature that examines the impact of CEO characteristics on firm performance 
with special focus on CEO industry experience. This study also complements prior findings related 
to CEO compensation (e.g. Jalal & Prezas, 2012, Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004) and firm risk-taking 
behavior (e.g. Faccio et al., 2016, Kovalchik et al., 2005) by documenting the effect of cross-
industry and specific-industry experience on CEO compensation. Thus, our paper adds to the basic 
age-old debate about whether CEO characteristics matter in important firm outcomes. The findings 
have considerable implication not only for board of directors who make executive hiring decisions 
but also for strategists in predicting the future strategic moves of competitors’ by analyzing CEO 
characteristics, particularly industry experience, of market competitors. Future research initiatives 
can be taken to investigate the variation in how CEO industry experience affects firm outcomes 
and CEO compensation across industries. 
 
REFERENCES 
Avery, C. N., & Chevalier, J. A. (1999). Herding over the career. Economics Letters, 63(3), 327-
333. 
Bailey, E. E., & Helfat, C. E. (2003). External management succession, human capital, and firm 
performance: An integrative analysis. Managerial and decision economics, 24(4), 347-
369. 
Barkema, H. G., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). Managerial compensation and firm performance: 
A general research framework. Academy of Management journal, 41(2), 135-145. 
Barker III, V. L., & Mueller, G. C. (2002). CEO characteristics and firm R&D 
spending. Management Science, 48(6), 782-801. 
28 
 
Boyson, N. M. (2003). Why do experienced hedge fund managers have lower returns. Version: 
November, 3, 2003. 
Bragaw, N. A., & Misangyi, V. F. (2017). The value of CEO mobility: contextual factors that 
shape the impact of prior CEO experience on market performance and CEO 
compensation. Human Resource Management, 56(2), 243-265 
Brockman, P., Lee, H. S. G., & Salas, J. M. (2016). Determinants of CEO compensation: 
Generalist–specialist versus insider–outsider attributes. Journal of Corporate Finance, 39, 
53-77. 
Calvet, L. E., & Sodini, P. (2014). Twin Picks: Disentangling the Determinants of Risk‐Taking in 
Household Portfolios. The Journal of Finance, 69(2), 867-906.  
Castanias, R. P., & Helfat, C. E. (1991). Managerial resources and rents. Journal of Management 
Castanias, R. P., & Helfat, C. E. (2001). The managerial rents model: Theory and empirical 
analysis. Journal of Management, 27(6), 661-678. 
Chahyadi, C. & Wineka, P. (2012). How does CEO career origin influence firm’s risk-taking? 
Academy of Economics and Finance, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 36, p 123-129.  
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal 
of financial Economics, 79(2), 431-468. 
Covin, J. G., & Slevin, D. P. (1988). The influence of organization structure on the utility of an 
entrepreneurial top management style. Journal of management studies, 25(3), 217-234.  
Custódio, C., Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. (2013). Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work 
experience and chief executive officer pay. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(2), 471-
492. 
Custódio, C., & Metzger, D. (2013). How do CEOs matter? The effect of industry expertise on 
acquisition returns. The Review of Financial Studies, 26(8), 2008-2047. 
Custódio, C., Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. (2017). Do general managerial skills spur 
innovation?. Management Science. 
Dass, N., Kini, O., Nanda, V., Onal, B., & Wang, J. (2013). Board expertise: Do directors from 
related industries help bridge the information gap?. The Review of Financial Studies, 27(5), 
1533-1592. 
Dechow, P. M., & Sloan, R. G. (1991). Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An 
empirical investigation. Journal of accounting and Economics, 14(1), 51-89. 
Dokko, G., Wilk, S. L., & Rothbard, N. P. (2009). Unpacking prior experience: How career 
history affects job performance. Organization Science, 20(1), 51-68. 
Drobetz, W., Von Meyerinck, F., Oesch, D., & Schmid, M. (2018). Industry expert 
directors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 92, 195-215.  
Eaton, J., & Rosen, H. S. (1983). Agency, delayed compensation, and the structure of executive 
remuneration. The Journal of Finance, 38(5), 1489-1505. 
Faccio, M., Marchica, M. T., & Mura, R. (2016). CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the 
efficiency of capital allocation. 
Falato, A., Li, D., & Milbourn, T. (2011). To each according to his ability? CEO pay and the 
market for CEOs. Unpublished working paper, Washington University in St Louis. 
Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2018). Industry expertise on corporate boards. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 50(2), 441-479. 
29 
 
Fee, C. E., & Hadlock, C. J. (2003). Raids, rewards, and reputations in the market for managerial 
talent. The Review of Financial Studies, 16(4), 1315-1357. 
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010). CEO compensation. Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ., 2(1), 75-102. 
Frydman, C. (2019). Rising through the ranks: the evolution of the market for corporate executives, 
1936–2003. Management Science. 
Gan, H. (2019). Does CEO managerial ability matter? Evidence from corporate investment 
efficiency. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 52(4), 1085-1118. 
Gaver, J. J., & Gaver, K. M. (1995). Compensation policy and the investment opportunity 
set. Financial management, 19-32. 
Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1992). Does executive compensation affect investment?. NBER 
Working Paper, (w4135). 
Gray, S., & Nowland, J. (2017). The diversity of expertise on corporate boards in 
Australia. Accounting & Finance, 57(2), 429-463.  
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its 
top managers. Academy of management review, 9(2), 193-206. 
Hamori, M., & Koyuncu, B. (2015). Experience matters? The impact of prior CEO experience on 
firm performance. Human Resource Management, 54(1), 23-44. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Chirico, F., Zyung, J., & Gambeta, E. (2017). Managerial risk taking: A 
multitheoretical review and future research agenda. Journal of Management, 43(1), 137-
169. 
Howard, A. (2001). Identifying, assessing, and selecting senior leaders. The nature of 
organizational leadership—Understanding the performance imperatives confronting 
today's leaders, 305-346. 
Huson, M. R., P. H. Malatesta, and R. Parrino. (2004). Managerial succession and firm 
performance. Journal of Financial Economics 74 (2):237-275.  
Jalal, A. M., & Prezas, A. P. (2012). Outsider CEO succession and firm performance. Journal of 
Economics and Business, 64(6), 399-426 
Kang, S., Kim, E. H., & Lu, Y. (2017). Does Independent Directors’ CEO Experience 
Matter?. Review of Finance. 
Karaevli, A. (2007). Performance consequences of new CEO ‘Outsiderness’: Moderating effects 
of pre‐and post‐succession contexts. Strategic Management Journal, 28(7), 681-706. 
Kovalchik, S., Camerer, C. F., Grether, D. M., Plott, C. R., & Allman, J. M. (2005). Aging and 
decision making: A comparison between neurologically healthy elderly and young 
individuals. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 58(1), 79-94. 
Li, M., & Patel, P. C. (2018). Jack of all, master of all? CEO generalist experience and firm 
performance. The Leadership Quarterly. 
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. The journal 
of finance, 60(6), 2661-2700. 
Mezghanni, B. S. (2010, May). How CEO attributes affect firm R&D spending? New evidence 
from a panel of French firms. In Crises et nouvelles problématiques de la Valeur (pp. CD-
ROM). 
Menkhoff, L., Schmidt, U., & Brozynski, T. (2006). The impact of experience on risk taking, 
overconfidence, and herding of fund managers: Complementary survey 
evidence. European Economic Review, 50(7), 1753-1766 
30 
 
Morrison, R. F., & Brantner, T. M. (1992). What enhances or inhibits learning a new job? A basic 
career issue. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77(6), 926. 
Mueller, P., Georgakakis, D., & Ruigrok, W. (2017). Jack of all trades or master of none? CEO 
experience variety and firm performance. In Academy of Management Proceedings (Vol. 
2017, No. 1, p. 17662). Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510: Academy of Management. 
Murphy, K. J., & Zabojnik, J. (2004). CEO pay and appointments: A market-based explanation 
for recent trends. American economic review, 94(2), 192-196. 
Ryan Jr, H. E., & Wiggins III, R. A. (2002). The interactions between R&D investment decisions 
and compensation policy. Financial Management, 5-29. 
Sujit, K. S., & Mukherjee, B. (2005). How Much Does R&D decision depend on firm, industry, 
group and its interactions (No. 0503008). University Library of Munich, Germany. 
Wang, C., Xie, F., & Zhu, M. (2015). Industry expertise of independent directors and board 
monitoring. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 50(5), 929-962 
Xu, P. (2015). Risk taking and firm growth. RIETI Discussion Paper, 15-E-061. 
Yanadori, Y., & Milkovich, G. T. (2002). Origin of CEO and compensation strategy: Differences 
between insiders and outsiders. CAHRS Working Paper Series, 44. 
Yung, K., & Chen, C. (2018). Managerial ability and firm risk-taking behavior. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 51(4), 1005-1032. 
Zajac, B., & Stearns, L. B. (1997). CEOs' Career Backgrounds and Corporate Long‐Term Strategic 
Planning. Sociological inquiry, 67(2), 207-226. 
Zhang, Y., & Rajagopalan, N. (2003). Explaining new CEO origin: Firm versus industry 
















Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std Dev 
Multi-ind N/A N/A 1.00 0.00 N/A 
Specific_ind 18.02 17 55 1 9.14 
Female  N/A N/A 1.00 0.00 N/A 
Tenure  6.3 5 49 0 7.1 
MBA N/A N/A 1.00 0.00 N/A 
PhD_Masters N/A N/A 1.00 0.00 N/A 
MTB 2.42 1.89 43.85 0.55 1.92 
Volatility  9.05 7.63 82.57 1.74 5.57 
Firm_perf 11.86 11.65 48.19 -240.38 9.56 
Capex 5.56 4.01 46.83 0.00 5.13 
R&D 6.24 0.54 2315.29 0.00 39.57 
Firm size 16848.08 7168.80 220217.00 51.04 25001.78 
Leverage 22.92 21.06 170.48 0.00 17.06 
Dividend 1.99 1.21 64.45 0.00 3.03 
NWC -138.31 70.90 2016 -8240 1183.95 
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 -0.68***  
(0.08) 
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 .4376 .4495 .2272 0.433 .4467 .2246 
N 4,816 2,525 2,291 4,816 2,525 2,291 
*, ** & *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Numbers in parentheses 




Table 3: Impact of CEO Industry Experience on R&D 
Independent 
variables 
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Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 .1999 .2496 .4161 0.1999 .2172 .4125 
N 4,816 2,525 2291 4,816 2,524 2,290 





Table 4: Impact of CEO industry experience on Compensation 
Independent 
variables 
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 .22 .16 .4638 0.217 .149 .4651 
N 4,796 2,514 2,282 4,796 2,514 2,282 




Table 5: Definition of Variables 
Variable  Description  
Multi-ind equals 1 if the CEO has more than one industry experience, 0 otherwise 
Specific_ind No. of years in the same industry (based on three-digit SIC code) 
Specific_ind_sq Square of Specific_ind variable 
CEO Control Variables 
Female 1 if female, 0 otherwise 
Tenure length of time CEOs served in the current position 
MBA 1 if the CEO has an MBA, and 0 otherwise 
PhD_Masters 1 if the CEO has either master’s or PhD, and 0 otherwise 
Firm Control Variables 
MTB Market-to-book ratio 
Volatility  Sum of the squared residual from the Fama-French’s (1993) three-factor 
model 
Firm_Perf Return on Asset 
Capex Capital expenditure/TA 
R&D R&D/Total sales 
Firm size Natural logarithm of total asset 
Leverage  Debt/ total assets 
Dividend Sum of dividends from preferred and common stock/ total assets  
NWC Net working capital 
Fixed asset Fixed asset/TA 
Compensation  Total compensation 
 
 
 
 
 
